the primary contribution of the judge to just sentencing and combats unwarranted sentencing disparity. The proposal reinstates the discretion characteristic of the pre-Guidelines regime, but creates sentencing panels and employs appellate review to inform and delimit the exercise of that discretion.
I. THE JUDGE'S ROLE UNDER THE PRIOR SYSTEM

A. The Input of the Various Players to the Sentencing Process
Under the pre-Guidelines system, criminal sentences were shaped and modified by the discretion exercised by prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation officers, parole commissioners, and sentencing judges. The prosecutor's power to affect sentences through the allocation of investigative resources and the initial decision to bring a charge in a given case had largely been accepted as necessary to the effective administration of the criminal justice system. 2 ' Less widely accepted, yet nearly as widespread, was the practice of overcharging defendants and subsequently bargaining to a reduced charge 21 in order to give the prosecutor increased leverage to induce guilty pleas. Not only could the prosecutor threaten to proceed to trial with a twenty-or fifty-count indictment, but the addition of charges usually allowed for the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence and permitted greater flexibility in the event new information was discovered.2
Depending upon the practice of a particular prosecutor or a particular district, the treatment of individual criminals or certain classes of criminals varied widely.2 3 Thus, a measure of disparity was injected into the process before the judge even began presiding over a case. However, due to the latitude that pre-Guidelines sentencing accorded judgesA the prosecutor's charging decision only had the practical effect of delimiting the defendant's maximum exposure.' Even so, the prosecutor's limited discretionary power arguably served a legitimate purpose by introducing the law enforcement viewpoint into the sentencing process.
Of course, any plea bargain necessarily required the agreement of the defendant. However, a defense attorney's ability to bargain at arm's length was 20. See hindered by the statistical reality that defendants convicted after trial received longer sentences than those who pleaded guilty. Defense counsel nevertheless alvays endeavored to obtain a sentence lower than that served by other similar defendants. In other words, the defense counsel's role was to introduce disparity into the sentencing process. Although the balance of power clearly tipped in favor of the prosecution, the defense counsel's objective played an important role in promoting the defendant's interests.
One restraint on the plea bargaining efforts of defense and prosecution was the probation officer, who submitted a presentence investigation report (PSI) to the sentencing judge. 27 The PSI included both the defense's and prosecution's versions of the crime, descriptions of uncharged crimes, the defendant's prior record, assessments of the impact suffered by victims, and personal data ranging from marital status to work history.' Under a system of indeterminacy, the information provided by the PSI was essential to the imposition of an informed, individualized sentence.
When issuing a sentence, the judge could freely draw upon any information in the PSI as well as virtually any other evidence found to be instructive. 29 Absent statutory minimum sentences, the judge could impose a sentence ranging from probation or a fine to the maximum statutory punishment. 30 This wide discretion provided a check on bargaining tactics by circumscribing gains achieved by the defendant from plea bargaining. 31 To accomplish this result, judges used "real offense" sentencing, basing the sentence on the characteristics of the offense and the actual behavior of the defendant, rather than on the bargained-for charge 2 The defendant did not necessarily know the rationale behind his sentence since explanations were not required of the judge 3 3 More- 29. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (judge "largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come"). 30 . A defendant convicted of bank robbery, for example, could receive probation or imprisonment for up to 20 years, and/or a fine of up to $5000. 18 U.S.C. § § 2113(a), 3651 (1988 
B. Implications of the Pre-Guidelines Approach
The sentencing process, as it existed prior to the Guidelines, is best described as an arrangement of overlapping discretion. The prosecutor, defense attorney, probation officer, judge, and parole commissioner each added an element of discretion, and thus, disparity. Theoretically, this approach comported well with notions of individualized justice. 37 The various actors, each with a particular informed perspective, were presumably free to make judgments on mitigating and aggravating circumstances. In particular, the judge considered myriad intangible factors that legislatures had historically regarded themselves ill equipped to consider." The aggregate effect of this decisionmaking calculus was therefore to accommodate a variety of appropriate viewpoints without permitting any one perspective to dictate the offender's sentence. 39 This often led to the creative use of intermediate sanctions (those short of incarceration) as judges tailored sentences to the individual offender°H ad the prior system worked in this ideal manner, sentencing variations would have been more defensible. Unfortunately, two major obstacles emerged. First, absent adequate communication, each player had too many opportunities to second-guess the others and to adjust his or her behavior accordingly. For instance, a prosecutor who considered a three-year sentence appropriate might have charged a defendant with an offense permitting a five-year rather than a three-year maximum sentence because he or she speculated that the judge would not impose the highest possible sentence." 1 in similar conjecture by, on the one hand, attempting to glean the prosecutor's intent from the charge and, on the other hand, discounting for the probable adjustment of the Parole Commission. 42 Second, among the decisionmakers considered here, judges exercised perhaps the least guided discretion. Prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation officers, and parole commissioners could rely on their specifically defined roles for direction in the sentencing process. Conversely, judges, accustomed to being rational, somewhat distant arbiters equipped with a framework of procedural rules, statutes, and common law precedents, now faced the emotional, gut-wrenching task of sentencing with little outside guidance. 4 3 In addition, the legal education and training undertaken by judges typically ignored sentencing issues." As a result, " [o] ne judge may sentence in order to rehabilitate, another to deter the offender... from committing a similar crime, a third to incapacitate, while a fourth may sentence simply to 'punish."' 4 5
The pre-Guidelines process encouraged the presentation of a variety of legitimate viewpoints. Unfortunately, although studies indicate that judges agreed on the basic issues to consider in sentencing, these studies also assert that disparate sentences nevertheless occurred, because judges lacked a framework for translating this agreement into consistent sentencing. Consequently, when the Commission attempted to fulfill its statutory mandate, it sought to redefine the judge's role in sentencing to provide better guidance.
II. THE SENTENCING CoMMIssIoN's GUIDELINES
The practical justification for sentencing commissions is that such bodies, composed of "people of stature, competence, devotion, and eloquence," 4 7 are better equipped than legislatures are to create a flexible, evolving, and comprehensive sentencing system. 4s Theoretically, a commission could proceed in note 17, at 745. Also, the policy in some jurisdictions, or of some judges, was not to allow recommendations. See Denver Hearing, supra note 25, at 81 (testimony of Judge John Kane, D. Colo.).
42. an informed and rational manner to adopt a unifying sentencing rationale, which would permit both understanding and elimination of unwarranted disparity. 4 9 A commission could also presumably examine and respond to the discretionary decisionmaking of every relevant party in the sentencing process. The Commission, however, did not accomplish these goals; instead, judges, accustomed to a role as the central figure in sentencing and the legitimate bearer of ultimate discretionary power, have found themselves with greatly diminished control. The .approach which emerged from the Commission's deliberations neither reflects a coherent sentencing philosophy, as Congress anticipated, nor retains the balanced discretion of the pre-Guidelines system.
A. The Failure of the Commission to Enunciate Purposes of Sentencing
As the sentencing reform movement began to pick up pace in the 1970's, it appeared that an overarching sentencing philosophy was within reach. A number of commentators swiftly rejected the previously influential rehabilitative model in favor of a "just deserts" approach. 0 Although a consensus on the proper role of punishment was not yet evident, the drafters of the SRA took a step towards developing a sentencing philosophy by requiring that courts consider the purposes of sentencing:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
5 '
The legislative history of the SRA indicates that Congress recognized the importance of articulating the purposes of sentencing, and more significantly, the need for those purposes to influence the severity of actual sentences. 
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A consistent theme voiced throughout the Commission's public hearings held after enactment of the SRA was that preliminary drafts of the Guidelines had lost sight of the multiple purposes of sentencing. A number of speakers expressed concern that the Commission had elevated retribution, in the form of incarceration, above all other principles as the primary objective in sentencing, while plainly disregarding rehabilitation. 55 In sum, speakers criticized the structure of punishments under the Guidelines for failing to correspond to the sentencing philosophies enunciated in the legislation. 6 The intensity of disapproval was such that perhaps the most common recommendation called for the Commission to return to Congress and seek clarification of the statutory mandate.
7
Despite the number and variety of suggestions offered, the Commission itself did little to create a system of guiding principles. Commissioners apparently did not even agree on the appropriate method of incorporating the sentencing philosophies into the Guidelines. For instance, Commissioners appeared to be at odds over whether the rehabilitation goal should be deemphasized in all sentences or considered on a case specific basis. 5 1 In the end, the Commission chose to express no rationale whatsoever, and instead "sought to solve both the practical and philosophical problems of developing a coherent sentencing system by taking an empirical approach that used as a starting point data estimating pre-Guidelines sentencing practice. '59 In other words, the Guidelines did little to further the debate over the proper goals of punishment. Commissioner Stephen Breyer defended the use (1987) (imprisonment is not always appropriate punishment). of typical past practices as a reasoned compromise necessitated by the institutional constraints of a group guidelines writing process. 6 0 Commissioner Paul Robinson offered a different explanation: "[E]ven the pivotal decision to follow mathematical averages of past sentences was never the subject of Commission debate or discussion," but was "the result of last minute, private arrangements. ' 61 Indeed, haste and stormy infighting characterized the Commission's deliberations. 62 Moreover, many decisions reflected the Comniissioners' fear of disturbing the bipartisan Congressional consensus to "get tough on crime," which had prompted enactment of the SRA. 63 Regardless of the reason, the Commission's failure to enunciate a sentencing philosophy represents a major flaw in the Guidelines. A sentencing rationale would have enabled the Commission to construct Guidelines capable of fulfilling defined societal objectives. The reliance on mathematical averages instead leads to sentences that sometimes further no particular purpose whatsoever. 6 4 Moreover, the judge is left without adequate guidance concerning when to individualize a sentence by moving towards one end or the other of a range or when to depart altogether. 6 5 Most significantly, without a sentencing rationale, judges, attorneys, defendants, and the public come no closer to understanding the reasons why a particular sentence is given. 64. For instance, a decision to pursue rehabilitation and deterrence goals with a drug addict ma9 lead to the use of incarceration, supervised release, hospital care, community treatment, and fines. However, applying a mathematical average of prison terms given to drug dealers may satisfy neither purpose in any given case. Prison may fail to rehabilitate and also may not consistently deter, depending on individual characteristics. House Hearings, supra note 3, at 761 (statement of Commissioner Robinson); see also Ogletree, supra note 3, at 1952-53 (Commission failed to address underlying purposes of criminal sanctions).
28 U.S.C. § 994(g) (1988).
65. 
B. The Commission's Exclusive Focus on Judicial Discretion
Efforts to eliminate disparity in sentencing have traditionally targeted judicial discretion. 66 In this respect, the SRA was no different. 67 To some extent the statute did address the other stages in the sentencing process by eliminating parole and by requiring the Sentencing Commission to develop policy statements regarding plea bargaining. 68 The Commission's Guidelines, however, did not expand greatly on these congressional efforts.
The Commission certainly recognized that plea bargaining could undermine the Guidelines by permitting the prosecution and defense to agree privately to the particular facts and charges to which the defendant would plead. 69 Under the Guidelines, this bargaining could effectively determine the sentence to be served. Nevertheless, the Commission opted to make no major effort to structure, control, or take account of plea bargaining and resolved instead to "study plea agreement practice under the guidelines and ultimately develop standards for judges.
' 70 The result was to limit drastically the Guidelines' ability to achieve fairness in the sentencing process.
Effective reform requires the development of reasoned sentencing principles to guide and inform judges in the exercise of their discretion. Congress, in enacting the SRA, envisaged the vehicle for such reforms to be a sentencing commission, endowed with the time, money, and expertise to craft a structure that would represent a coherent approach to punishment and that would adapt to the realistic interplay of discretion in the sentencing process. Neither purpose was accomplished. Consequently, the next part argues, the imperfect discretion of the pre-Guidelines approach has been replaced by an equally disturbing form of imperfect discretion that perpetuates unwarranted disparity.
III. THE JUDGE'S ROLE UNDER THE GUIDELINES
A. The Prosecutor's Exercise of Discretion and De Facto Sentencing Power
Under the Guidelines, as under the previous system, the prosecution and defense can manipulate charges in order to limit the defendant's sentence exposure. Unlike the previous system, however, the plea bargain reached under the Guidelines will dictate the sentence within a very narrow range. Also, because the Guidelines heighten the importance of certain facts in a case, 71 the ability of counsel to bargain over these facts creates opportunities for disparity. By bargaining over ambiguous or contested facts, the parties can recharacterize the offense and significantly reduce the defendant's sentence. Moreover, the prosecutor's power to influence the ultimate sentence is enhanced by a provision permitting downward departures based upon the offender's substantial assistance to law enforcement officials in investigating and prosecuting others. 72 Because the departure can only be provided upon motion of the government, the question of whether assistance is "substantial" is left entirely to the discretion of the prosecutor. 73 There is every indication that manipulation of the Guidelines occurs through charge and fact bargaining. The overwhelming majority of judges perceive that plea agreements frequently dismiss provable charges and that the parties often negotiate facts relevant to the Guidelines. 74 Although the level of manipulation is impossible to pinpoint, studies indicate that it transpires in every district in at least a significant minority of cases. 75 In the area of departures for substantial assistance, prosecutors sometimes make motions on behalf of defendants regardless of the quality of their assistance in order to induce guilty pleas, benefit defendants they find sympathetic, or mitigate sentences they consider too harsh.
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Without the overlapping discretion characteristic of the previous process, the prosecutor enjoys largely unchecked and unrestrained powers. Whatever counteracting effect the defense attorney once had in plea bargaining remains 71. With any system of guidelines, the procedures for developing facts are crucial since the sentence will represent many implicit findings of facts that do not comprise elements of the offense charged. See Peter B. Pope, Note, How Unreliable Facifinding Can Undermine Sentencing Guidelines, 95 YALE L.J. 1258 (1986). The Guidelines require increases or decreases in a sentence based upon certain factual offense characteristics. See, e.g., U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 2A2.2(b)(2) (brandishing "dangerous weapon" during aggravated assault raises defendant's base score by three levels).
72 limitedV 7 The probation officer's PSI also provides only an inconsistent and ineffective constraint on bargaining practices. Often, neither the defense nor the prosecution will cooperate with probation officers for fear that facts uncovered will upset their plea agreement. 78 Even when the probation officer is able to present the court with an omitted fact, the prosecution and defense can rely on ambiguities of proof by stating that the evidence at trial would not support the probation officer's version of the facts.
9
In addition, judges cannot readily review, much less check, the prosecutorial discretion exercised to attain plea bargains. The Commission responded to plea bargaining discretion by requiring that the agreements "adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior" and that factual stipulations be accurate and honest. 80 However, the efficacy of these requirements rests heavily on the ability of the judge to know or learn of relevant facts.
8 1 Unless a judge aggressively dissects plea agreements, the limited discretionary authority granted judges under the Guidelines may be insufficient to counteract prosecutorial maneuvers. Similarly, the Guidelines adopt a "modified real offense sentencing" approach, which basically requires the court to sentence on the basis of "acts or omissions" for which the defendant is held responsible in addition to the offense for which the defendant is convicted. 3 This procedure seeks to limit the effectiveness of plea bargaining in determining the ultimate sentence by permitting the court to look beyond the charge to the offender's real offense behavior.' Again, without accurate factual development this provision cannot produce the desired effect.85 Finally, regardless of the decisions of prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation officers, and judges, the Parole Commission under the previous regime could level disparate sentences. The SRA eliminated this last potential check.
The prosecutor thus, in effect, retains discretion under the Guidelines to generate disparate sentences. 8 6 Indeed, as many courts have recognized, the Guidelines have essentially transferred sentencing discretion from judges to prosecutors. 8 7 That the prosecutor exercises this discretion should surprise no one. Given the nature of the criminal justice system, even ethical prosecutors, undeniably pressured to obtain convictions in every case, do not feel compelled to resolve abstract issues of disparity. 88 A prosecutor's bargaining position is determined not by a perception of what sentences "similar" defendants do or should receive, but by caseload pressures, weaknesses in a particular case, and the need to secure timely guilty pleas. 9 In addition, in cases involving multiple defendants, the prosecutor may bargain aggressively and quickly with the defendants whose assistance is needed to "make" the case against the remaining defendants. The point here is not that these considerations are illegitimate but that they relate indirectly or even perversely to the goal of minimizing disparity. In other words, plea bargaining by its very nature creates disparities.
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Sentencing Guidelines out of a concern that failure to induce adequate numbers of guilty pleas will sink an already overburdened federal criminal justice system. ' Whether any of these reasons applies in a particular case, the defendant, judge, and the public will never know. While prosecutors often grant sentencing concessions in an effort to fulfill their own sense of justice, 91 they may also conceivably consider racial or other impermissible factors. One can only be sure that the existence of sentencing disparity will depend in part upon which prosecutor is assigned to the case. 92 
B. The Judge's Unguided Exercise of Discretion
Prosecutor-driven disparity is exacerbated by the fact that no coherent sentencing philosophy guides the judicial discretion that remains under the Guidelines. The Guidelines permit a district court to depart from the specified sentencing ranges when it finds an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately considered by the Commission in formulating the Guidelines. 9 3 However, this is a tall order to fill: the Commission considered a number of potentially mitigating circumstances, such as age, education, mental condition, and family responsibilities, and deemed them "not ordinarily relevant" in making the departure determination. 94 In reviewing departures, courts of appeals have strictly construed this language. 95 Wash. 1990 ) ("The critical first inquiry for any defense lawyer in assessing the seriousness of the case against his or her client is not the offense charged, but which AUSA is handling the matter."). Sometimes the discretion may not even be exercised by the prosecutor handling the case. In at least one district, decisions on whether to move for downward departure are made by a secret committee that determines which defendants will be permitted to cooperate with the government. Nevertheless, judges do have the opportunity to depart. The point is not that judges are unable to individualize sentences by departing or by sentencing at either end of a range, but rather that in exercising this discretion, judges use different sentencing philosophies and thus arrive at disparate sentences. Those judges disposed to rigidity defer to the Guidelines' ranges, while those who prefer leniency search for loopholes. 97 Even when two judges sentence two identically situated defendants within a particular range, the sentences may legally differ by as much as twenty-five percent. 98 Alternatively, judges who feel powerless to individualize sentences or are otherwise hostile to the Guidelines tolerate and even encourage evasion of the Guidelines. 99 This failure of the Guidelines to develop a sentencing rationale contributes to what many judges feel is a painful choice between injustice to the defendant and infidelity to the Guidelines."to As a result, what sentence a defendant receives can still depend largely upon which judge presides at sentencing-precisely the situation the Guidelines were designed to eliminate.
C. The Consequences of the Guidelines Approach
Disparity is alive and well under the Guidelines. First, many of the same criticisms leveled against judicial sentencing under the prior system also apply to the de facto sentencing by prosecutors under the Guidelines. It can be arbitrary and unpredictable, depending more on the inclinations of the particular prosecutor than on any rational or quantifiable process. In many ways, however, the current approach is worse than the previous one. Prosecutors are no doubt subject to a wider range of pressures, from adversarial to professional to political, than are judges. 1 01 Furthermore, if discretion is to be exercised in sentencing, it seems unwise to vest it in the typically less experienced, less knowledgeable prosecutor."° Beyond altering the power structure of the sentencing process, the Guidelines have also altered its nature by driving discretion 152, 153 (1990) . At least where judges opt for the departure "loophole," appellate review may provide some guidance. However, where the court acquiesces to Guidelines manipulation or sentences at one end of a range, the review safeguard is unavailable.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (1988 underground so that issues of disparity reach resolution through negotiations between prosecution and defense instead of before the court.0 3 Second, the imposition of disparate sentences by judges is more objectionable now than it was prior to enactment of the Guidelines. In the past, judges invested substantial energy and emotion into fashioning appropriately individualized sentences. Today, the arithmetic and technical nature t°4 of the Guidelines deprives judges of the sense of personal responsibility for principled sentences. According to one judge, "[t]he false aura of scientific certainty distances the court from the offender, as well as from the reasons for punishment." 1 While some judges still fight to introduce their sense of fairness, others withdraw from the process out of frustration. 1 " Moreover, the complexities and ambiguities of the Guidelines make it common for judges to differ honestly as to the applicability of a particular provision." t Whatever the 104. An example is the spurious objectivity of varying the length of a robber's imprisonment by the number of dollars stolen. U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 2B3.1(b)(6). As one judge objected: "The point is, the person who came in to rob the bank intended to get everything that was in that cash drawer regardless of the amount, and the seriousness of the event Even more problematic is the requirement that an LSD dealer's sentence be calculated on the basis of the "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of" LSD. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v) (1988); U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 2Dl.l(c) n.*. The Supreme Court has upheld this provision, mandating that the weight of both the LSD and the medium in which it was carried be used to determine the dealer's sentence. Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919 Ct. (1991 . The absurd result is that, under the Guidelines, a first offender selling 100 doses of LSD would be sentenced to 188 to 235 months for using sugarcubes, 63 to 78 months for using blotter paper, 27 to 33 months for using gelatin capsules, and only 10 to 16 months if the drug were sold in pure form. Id. at 1924 n.2. As Judge Posner noted in his dissent to the lower court opinion, this scheme bears no relation to the defendant's culpability and furthers no rational sentencing purpose. United States v. Marshall, 908 F2d 1312, 1333 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., dissenting) ("A person who sells LSD on blotter paper is not a worse criminal than one who sells the same number of doses in gelatin cubes, but he is subject to heavier punishment.... [E]ven the Justice Department cannot explain the why of the punishment scheme it is defending .... "). Moreover, the result is huge disparity among LSD dealers selling an equal number of doses, and huge disparity between LSD dealers and other drug dealers. Id. at 1335. 
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The Yale Law Journal cause, disparity is the result, demonstrating the failure of the Guidelines system to inform and advance an understanding of sentencing.
Perhaps worst of all, the public is being misled about the extent of disparity under the Guidelines. The Commission's 1989 Annual Report boasts that eighty-two percent of the sentences issued during that year were within the Guidelines range as established by the court." 0 8 This rather simplistic compliance data ignores the types of prosecutorial and judicial decisionmaking discussed in this Note. 1 0 9 Moreover, no empirical study can adequately measure the reduction in disparity because notions of disparity depend upon normative conceptions of the proper goals of sentencing."' Thus, the conclusion that disparity has been reduced proves only that the Guidelines system has more consistently applied its own criteria, not that it is any "fairer" than the preGuidelines regime."' Unfortunately, incremental improvements to the Guidelines will not solve the problem.' The Guidelines are not performing adequately, and attractive alternatives, such as the one proposed in this Note, are available.
IV. A JUDICIALLY MANAGED PROCESS OF CHECKS AND BALANCES
Those who design a sentencing process must recognize that discretion is not an evil per se. Rather, discretion should be viewed as an inevitable compo-nent of the criminal justice system that, when exercised properly, permits consideration of the myriad individual characteristics unaccounted for in a guidelines matrix. On the other hand, justifying a decision by mere reference to a decisionmaker's discretion can be a way of shirking an obligation to present a convincing rationale for the decision."' Therefore, the goal of sentencing reform should not be to reduce the absolute amount of discretion available in the system, but to require that it be checked, balanced, and explained in a manner that promotes just sentencing. Finally, a successful sentencing process must have the support of the judges who administer it. ' 
A. Sentencing Panels To Inform and Check Discretion
A Proposal
To begin with, the current Guidelines should be scrapped and the Commission redirected toward establishing a recast guidelines framework based upon general rules of decision. Professor Albert Alschuler has offered one promising approach: authorize the Commission to draft a type of administrative precedent for "recurring paradigmatic cases." 1 5 The Commission, under Alschuler's proposal, would study these "normal" cases, such as that of a disadvantaged young man who engages in small-scale drug dealing because of the prospect of easy money, and identify an appropriate sentence based upon the sentencing purpose(s) considered most important in that type of case.1 6 This sentence would act something like a precedent, which district courts could either follow or distinguish." 7 If this approach, or some variant thereof, were adopted, the guidelines would serve not to constrain judges rigidly but to provide them with a reasoned starting point for further deliberation.1 8 These precedential guidelines would assist each judge's individual decisionmaking calculus. In order to enhance communication among judges, sentencing could be performed by rotating three-judge panels, sitting perhaps weekly or monthly to sentence cases they had accumulated. Prior to sentencing, the judges would have the benefit of the probation officer's PSI, and at sentencing, the judges could note the defendant's demeanor evidence and testimony. During 118. These guidelines would also play an important role in developing a principled common law of sentencing by providing a benchmark against which a judge could compare her sentences and, perhaps, her sentencing philosophy as well. Moreover, appellate courts would have a standard that would aid the evaluation of sentences. See infra note 157 and accompanying text. a recess, the judges would confer, and a majority decision would determine the sentence. All sentences imposed would require a statement of reasons together with any dissenting opinion. The sentencing panel would be obligated, in its sentencing statement, either to adhere to the Commission's precedential guidelines or to distinguish the case. In either scenario, our understanding of sentencing would be advanced by an instructive dialogue established among judges as well as between the Commission and the courts.
Experience With Sentencing Councils
Sentencing councils, established during the 1960's in federal district courts in Detroit, New York, and Chicago, resembled the proposed panels in many respects. 11 9 Unlike the panels, however, these councils met informally, the recommendations of the other judges did not bind the sentencing judge, and no guidelines existed. 2 Participating judges expressed great enthusiasm about the councils, reporting that the process had led to more principled and objective judicial attitudes, virtual unanimity on the factors most relevant to sentencing, increased use of sentencing options, and a heightened appreciation for the importance of sentencing purposes.
12 1 The council meeting was an educational process that pooled knowledge and experience, served to acclimate new judges, and moderated the views of older colleagues."
Despite the uniformly laudatory reviews of judges, however, a number of statistical studies concluded that councils did very little to diminish impermissible disparity." 2 The studies found that the nonbinding nature of the council recommendations permitted judges to continue to pursue individual notions of justice and even polarized the views of some judges."a The commentators argued that three judges could not determine the principles of sentencing any better than one judge could.' 5 The panels suggested in this Note respond to both criticisms. First, since the panels require concurrence, a judge would necessarily respond to the other judges' views and adjust her own perspective accordingly. Second, because the panels would receive precedential guidelines, panels would be afforded the sentencing experience of a body of full-time sentencing experts.
Advantages of Sentencing Panels
Sentencing panels would play a central role in a new sentencing system. Perhaps the greatest appeal of panels lies in their procedural form, requiring judges to be both active and interactive. The panels would encourage the sharing of experiences and wisdom that occurred in sentencing councils, 1 6 and the requirement of sentencing rulings would concretize the dialogue on sentencing. 1 2 7 By informing this discussion with precedential guidelines, disparity resulting from differences in sentencing philosophy would be limited.
Moreover, panels could also limit disparity by checking discretion in two ways. First, basic to the SRA was the notion that only disparity that falls outside of some acceptable bounds should be eradicated.s Mandating the concurrence of at least two judges would severely check the discretion of any one judge to sentence far outside the norm. Second, elimination of the Guidelines regime and the presence of three judges to scrutinize plea agreements would limit prosecutorial bargaining power. At the same time, the ability of the prior system to incorporate the perspectives of various parties to the process through overlapping discretion would return.
Finally, the panel approach would encourage intermediate sanctions that more accurately serve sentencing purposes. At sentencing, the judge's discretion to consider purposes, together with guidance from the precedential guidelines, would enhance consideration of available options. 130. Consider an example from pre-and post-Guidelines sentencing: DefendantA, a contractor, pleaded guilty to bribing a government official in 1986 (pre-Guidelines) and was sentenced in 1989 to two years
Potential Criticisms
There are, to be sure, practical concerns with the panel approach. One fear is that geographically based disparity will eliminate any possibility of nationwide sentencing uniformity. Arguably, however, local conditions should affect sentences in some instances to fulfill relevant sentencing purposes."' For example, deterrence of alien smuggling may require the imposition of heavy prison terms in Texas, but the same sentence may have little deterrent effect and may make little sense in Massachusetts."' In addition, the imposition of community standards, as reflected by a district court's sentences, might well result in a justifiable disparity nationwide. 3 ' Until society reaches a consensus on sentencing purposes, it cannot be said whether certain types of disparities, such as those between districts, should be deemed "unwarranted."
A second and more formidable consideration involves resources; the last thing the overburdened federal court system needs is a sentencing process that requires three times the amount of judicial time. 134 Considering, however, that judges spent only about one hour per case on sentencing prior to the Guidelines 35 and that they typically terminate only about forty criminal cases a year, 136 to require an average of three hours per case, or 120 hours per year, does not seem unreasonable. 137 Even conceding the resource burden, the of full-time community service and three more years of part-time service. A was sentenced, atA's suggestion, to build a summer camp for children with spina bifida, finance up to $250,000 of the project costs, and be subject to supervision by the local Spina Bifida Association. Defendant B, a union official, was sentenced for participation in a bribery scheme that occurred after the Guidelines had gone into effect. B also proposed a structured community service program, but because of the judge's limited options under the Guidelines, B was sentenced to prison for 24 months. See Hoelter, supra note 40, at 39.
131. See Denver Hearing, supra note 25, at 101 (testimony of Judge John Kane, D. Colo.) (lack of law enforcement manpower in rural areas requires especially lengthy sentences for deterrence); id. at 169-70 (testimony of Donna Chavez, Assistant Attorney General, Navajo Nation) (nature of Native-American communities should affect sentencing Indeed, it seems incongruous that society readily sacrifices enormous resources in determining the guilt of a defendant and yet is reluctant to invest the energy to establish the appropriate penalty. 13 9 The impetus behind the Commission and the Guidelines was not to save money, but to further just sentencing. 14°S imilarly, the evaluation of the panel approach offered here should rest on the proposal's potential to improve sentencing rather than merely on its efficiency. 141 Finally, the cost of panels may be less troublesome in light of the aggregate resource effect the Guidelines have had on the criminal justice system. First, judges have found sentencing under the Guidelines to be more time consuming than sentencing under the previous regime. 4 While the panel approach will no doubt require even more time from judges, the point here is simply that the Guidelines do not escape this criticism either.
Second, the Guidelines represent an important component in the "severity revolution" of harsher penalties and longer terms of imprisonment, the direct result of which is a larger prison population. 43 The United States already incarcerates a higher proportion of its residents than any other industrialized nation. 1 " If trends continue, the number of federal prisoners will exceed capacity by 70% in four years, despite massive construction of new facilities." a In enacting sentencing reform legislation, Congress clearly wished to avoid the immense costs of a burgeoning corrections population. 1 " There can be little doubt that abandonment of the Guidelines, with its lengthy terms of incarceration, would alleviate this burden to some extent. 147 Furthermore, judges freed of the Guidelines under this new regime would not only rely less on imprisonment but make more effective use of intermediate sanctions." The Guidelines' focus on incarceration has limited the use of intermediate sanctions by restricting nonprison options to 10% of the sentencing grid boxes. 149 Conversely, under the pre-Guidelines system, judges had the discretion to individualize sentences and made particularly frequent use of the probation alternative. 15 In addition, one of the recognized attributes of the sentencing council arrangement was the enhanced debate and awareness among judges of sentencing options.' Thus, sentencing panels should similarly promote greater application of intermediate sanctions, which will undoubtedly alleviate some of the burden on the penal system.
Taken together, these three factors indicate that the panel approach to sentencing may in fact consume fewer of the aggregate criminal justice system resources than the current Guidelines approach does.
B. Appellate Review For the Development of a Common Law of Sentencing
The British have long recognized the ability of appellate courts to harmonize the views of judges and to reduce disparity." 5 2 Of course, thanks to the impulse to attempt to work around a set of constrictive Guidelines, judges would fulfill a constructive function as the implementers and reviewers of a new sentencing approach. Finally, the primary mode of evolution, common law development, is a proven method, familiar to both judges and the public.
V. CONCLUSION
Those who concluded that the pre-Guidelines system was a failure traced the fault to judges exercising discretion inconsistently and unfairly. This Note argues that restraining judicial discretion with a Guidelines matrix was both an ineffective and ill-advised response. Not only did the sentencing process lose the potential benefits of discretion, but the process became skewed in a way that promoted new, and arguably more troubling, forms of disparity. Sentencing reform that aspires to eradicate unwarranted disparity must begin by aiming to optimize the ability of discretion to account for individual differences among offenders. It should tap the abilities and experiences that judges bring to the sentencing process in a manner that elicits dialogue yet checks abuse. Only in this way can sentencing theory evolve.
